


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PARI Working Papers

The New US Debate over Nuclear Weapons

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How to deal with North Korea's armament policies and how to assess Trump's response to Kim Jong-un is immediate and dangerous issue in East Asia today. It is also a symptom of the larger problem that we are facing globally: the intensification of the strategic nuclear arms race between the U.S. and Russia and between the U.S. and China at a time of the revival of their geo-political rivalries all around the world.

This context of the Trump-Kim problem has two paradoxically opposed aspects: One is the "ban the bomb" movement, which has registered its greatest victory since 1945 – namely, the UN approval of the "Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons," which the General Assembly approved by an overwhelming majority. The nations that voted *no* were U.S. allies, the NATO countries, also Japan. There are already 53 signatures, and it becomes international law once there are over 50 ratifications. Meanwhile, the global abolitionists' victory has energized pressures in the Congress to de-nuclearize U.S. grand strategy.

The other systemic development is the intensification of the strategic arms race, particularly in nuclear weapons, arms race, reflected in growing support among U.S. strategists for the doctrine of limited strategic nuclear war the so-called nuclear modernization program. I advertised our discussion today as the "New U.S. Nuclear Debate." Actually, it's not new. Many of you have lived through versions of it. The context is somewhat new and some of the expressions are new, but it's useful for us to dwell a bit on the historical antecedents of the so-called new debate starting with the Truman era, featuring competitive U.S. and Soviet plans for general and complete nuclear disarmament, which neither side thought really had a chance of being accepted.

Also, in the early post World War II period, as today in the debates over how to deal with North Korea, there were advocates within the U.S. government and some outside of the U.S. government of the preventive war. Preventive nuclear strikes to disarm the Soviets before they would have a comparable nuclear capability. Truman himself was badgered to

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use nuclear weapons in the Korean war, which he rejected. His controversy with General McArthur was to a large extent a controversy over the president's view that the war in Korea should be kept limited, geographically and in weapons, versus McArthur's notion that we ought to exploit our nuclear superiority while we had it.

Within the Truman administration, strategists like Paul Nitze and Dan Acheson were worried about the situation that would develop in the mid-1950s. 1954 was indicated as the year of maximum danger, when the Soviets would have a comparable nuclear strategic capability and therefore, the balance of power globally would change because the Soviets would have conventional or non-nuclear superiority. This was the primary strategic concern of the Truman administration.

The Eisenhower administration overrode that concern of the Truman administration strategists. The President and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles threatened that if the truce negotiated with the North Koreans at the end of the Truman administration broke down, the renewal of war would not be restricted with respect to the weapons or geography. Instead, the United States was adopting a "massive retaliation" strategy based on a great capacity to respond to local aggression, in Asia, in Europe, in the Middle East, at times and places and weapons (including nuclear) of the America's own choosing.

The strategic policies of successive administrations were presented to the public as a unified position within the government; but they were actually highly debated within the government itself. In the Eisenhower administration, for example, General Maxwell Taylor, an influential military strategist, argued unsuccessfully that the massive retaliation threat was a very injudicious policy on the part of the Eisenhower administration. Eventually, the capability that had been predicted of the Soviets would achieve by 1954, was already showing itself. Democratic opposition to the Eisenhower administration started hammering the idea that the nuclear-centered grand strategy was one of suicide or surrender.

Meanwhile, however, there were actual crisis in which the Eisenhower administration did threaten, did brandish nuclear weapons. During the two off-shore islands confrontations in the Strait of Taiwan in the 1950s the Eisenhower and Dulles threatened to use nuclear weapons. What Eisenhower really would have done if Mao implemented his aggressive threats nobody knows. The strategy also had a European and NATO manifestation in the form of the so-called nuclear tripwire – that is, forward deployed battlefield nuclear weapons that would be activated if the Soviets attempted a military move on Berlin and/or westward into the Federal Republic of Germany. The NATO response might initially be with "tactical" nuclear weapons, but would then escalate. Indeed, there were very serious confrontations over Berlin, in which Eisenhower and Khrushchev threatened each other with nuclear war. Whether those threats were bluffs or not, fortunately, we didn't have to examine.

But military strategists advising the Democratic party and a few dissenters within the Eisenhower administration like Maxwell Taylor were saying this was stupid policy for the United States to pursue. They advocated instead, a policy called “flexible response”, which held that at every rung of the escalation ladder, the United States should not be at a disadvantage, and if possible to be able to show dominance at every level.

What about the nuclear level? That was very controversial within the Kennedy administration. Robert McNamara and a number of my colleagues at the RAND Cooperation, who when recruited into the government were called the Whiz Kids, indicated that they thought that the policy of flexible response should also prevail at the level of strategic nuclear war. Secretary of Defense McNamara was at first intrigued by this idea. In early 1962, he made a major speech at the ministerial meetings of the Defense Ministers in Athens, Greece in which he unveiled the notion that in order to re-establish credibility of the United States’ confrontation of the Soviet Union to resist aggression, particularly in Europe, the United States, if it ever had to escalate to nuclear war, would not hit cities. This was the famous “no cities” or “controlled counterforce” notion.

The European allies were not reassured by the no-cities strategy. They thought this was a cop out, a renunciation of a clear and credible threat to escalate any major conflict in Europe to the nuclear level. The Soviets meanwhile ridiculed the idea of controlled counterforce: How could you ever, once nuclear war started, restrict the targets? Even if you tried there would be inaccuracies. There could be no such thing as a no-cities nuclear war. And after the Cuban missile crisis, McNamara himself, had a crisis of conscience, which later in some of his books and recordings he admitted to, regarding any nuclear war as too horrible, and believing that the only way to protect humankind from such a disaster was to avoid confrontations like the superpowers had over Cuba and Berlin.

McNamara’s post- Cuban missile crisis nuclear pacifism (while he was still in office as Secretary of Defense) was reflected in his attempts to restrict the U.S. nuclear arsenal to what he called an assured destruction capability. This would assure that no matter how large and successful a Soviet attack might be against the United States, the surviving U.S. nuclear weapons could still devastate the Soviet Union, outweighing any gains the Kremlin could hope to gain from their aggression, thus deterring them.

McNamara translated this assured destruction (AD)-only posture into budgetary policies and knocked down proposals particularly from the Air Force to do strategic counterforce. He rejected these, saying that the only role now for nuclear weapons would be to deter the attack by nuclear weapons from our principal adversaries, so assured destruction should be the policy. He also drew the radical implication (very controversial at the time) that it would be good if the Soviets also had this kind of a survivable capability, to relieve their

fears that the United States was planning a nuclear first strike against them. We would have a *mutual* assured destruction relationship, MAD being the acronym that was henceforth bandied about, so that each side would hold the other's population hostage against nuclear attack. Any other capabilities would not be accepted. Late in his tenure, McNamara was able to convince President Lyndon Johnson to embrace this basic strategic move. He persuaded Johnson to meet with Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey in 1968 to convince the Soviets that we should both abandon counterforce nuclear strategies, and both rely on assured destruction, deterrence-only nuclear strategies.

At first, Premier Kosygin and his entourage at Glassboro thought this was ridiculous. You're going to give away defense? You're going to make your own society vulnerable to the others? However, McNamara was very eloquent and began to move the Soviets in the direction of seeing the virtue of an assured destruction capability on both sides which could never be reduced by an attack from the other side to a level below that required for a society-destroying retaliatory blow.

But this movement toward a MAD accord was interrupted by the Soviet repression of the Dubček liberation uprising in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was an election year in the United States and the Republicans were challenging most aspects of the Democrats' grand strategy that got us into war in Vietnam. The Republicans also regarded the US-Soviet arms control initiative that McNamara was advocating as some kind of heresy. How could you possibly put on the same moral level an assured destruction capability for both of the super powers. The Republican National Convention in 1968 affirmed that United States' position should not be for any kind of a parity or equality in strategic capabilities, but for superiority.

But now in office, Nixon and Kissinger (both of whom during the election campaign had advocated U.S. superiority and rejected the McNamara MAD policy) facing a Vietnam war-weary Congress reluctant to fund any major military capabilities, particularly strategic weapons, did a complete 180-degree turn and started talking within the administration over the objection of the Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird that we ought to actually move in this direction of an institutionalization of a mutual assured destruction. Kissinger in particular argued that it would be a "sufficient" deterrent for the United States to have the assured destruction capability; and possibly McNamara was correct when he said it might stabilize the situation if the Soviets also had it. The surprising embrace of MAD by Nixon and Kissinger -- it became a centerpiece of their détente with the Soviet Union -- resulted in the SALT accord of 1972 and the ABM Treaty restricting anti-ballistic missiles to just a few sites.

The next major turn in U.S. nuclear weapons policy was also a surprise, less for its substance than because of who authorized it: Jimmy Carter, the most pacifistically

inclined of post-World War II presidents. Late in Carter's term, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, told him that the Soviets were cheating on the mutual assured destruction arms control arrangements. The Soviets were developing capabilities for fighting a war if deterrence failed, for selective and controlled nuclear strikes against U.S. military forces particularly. The advisers convinced Carter that if we allowed ourselves to be in a position which we only had an assured destruction capability for knocking out Soviet cities and the Soviet Union had a more sophisticated capability, the United States would be at a severe strategic disadvantage. Accordingly, they got President Carter to issue detailed guidance to the military for employing nuclear weapons in combat, not just threatening to use them in an assured destruction mode.

Carter's famous nuclear-use document, NSC-59, which is now declassified, called for "a capability to choose to put the major weight of our initial response on military and controlled targets." The targets "must be selected for the purpose of destroying enemy forces or their ability to counter out military operations." These were to include military command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities, and all other "military forces stationary and mobile, industrial facilities, which provide immediate support to military operations during war time." The methods of attack on particular targets "should be chosen to limit collateral damage, limit damage to civilians and to urban areas, limit attacks on general industry and population targets, *consistent with covering the objective target.* [my italics]"

Thus, the MAD relationship with the Soviet Union became *MAD plus*, which became the new normal of U.S. strategic planning. With some variations to accommodate new technologies it is apparently still the new normal for what now is in the President's "football" -- the apparatus that you've heard about, which is always in the vicinity of the President, containing the nuclear codes that he can implement.

Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the Cold War, and the preoccupation with terrorism, and with presumably irrational "rogue" states and movements in possession of nuclear weapons, a new dialectic has emerged about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. In 2007, during the administration of George W. Bush, the so-called Gang of Four (former Secretary of State George Schultz, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and former Senate Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Samuel Nunn) published the first in a series of opinion pieces in the *Wall Street Journal*, arguing that at this dangerous juncture in history, we should make a major effort for the first time to arrive at a world without nuclear weapons

This intervention in the national discourse by these very respected realist authorities

on grand strategy shook up the policy community at first. It also stimulated peace movement types for the first time in a long time, to come out of the woodwork and join in a resurgent abolitionist movement to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

This was the context for President Obama's famous April 5, 2009 speech in Prague championing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, which got the bulk of media attention. However, what didn't get the publicity was the caveat in that speech. Granting that the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons probably couldn't be realized in his lifetime, he went on to warn: "Make no mistake. As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies. In other words, as long as nuclear weapons exist the United States is going to have a very robust nuclear arsenal."

This caveat didn't get any of the headlines, and yet it was there quite prominently in the Prague speech. It was, however, reflected in the basic Nuclear Posture Statement of the Obama administration in 2010. Let me quote from that:

Indeed as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces including deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons, highly capable nuclear delivery systems, and command and control capabilities. And the physical infrastructure and the expert personnel needed to sustain them, these nuclear facilities will continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries, reassuring allies and partners around the world and promoting stability in key regions.

This basic nuclear strategy was embraced across the parties. By congressional mandate the Trump administration will be producing their own Nuclear Posture Review. My prediction is that it will reaffirm the basic caveat articulated by President Obama. It won't mention his name favorably, but will reaffirm this basic philosophy for structuring the U.S. grand strategy for the use of nuclear weapons and a series of new programs which not only modernize the nuclear arsenal but will more deeply integrate nuclear weapons into U.S. grand strategy.

The current focus on nuclear modernization – despite Obama's claim to be reducing the role of nukes -- had its origins in the Obama administration's spokespersons' efforts to get the New START Treaty approved by Congress in the Spring of 2010 by reassuring Senators that the administration was committed to maintain a robust nuclear arsenal which would not only preserve the MAD stability, but would improve on it, even though the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons were being reduced. MAD would still exist, though that was not the term used anymore. Now the term used by the Obama administration was

mutual assured stability. Moreover, it would be improved. But in a nod to the nuclear disarmament constituency, Obama administration officials pledged in statements to journalists who interviewed them that the nuclear modernization would not involve new systems. It would only involve improvements in the existing nuclear arsenal.

We now have indications as to what these improvements are. Clearly, they involve new systems as well as improved systems. For example, there will be a modernization and replacement program for Minuteman III ICBMs at the cost of about 7 billion dollars. This deployment of improved Minuteman ICBMs is supposed to last through 2030. But, more than that, there would be a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile to replace the Minuteman III by about 2045, at a cost of some 140 billion dollars. And the Air Force would plan to purchase over 600 of these new ICBMs. There would also be a modernization program for the B2 bomber, and initiatives to improve radar and high frequency satellite communication capabilities for nuclear command and control. There would be modifications of the B52H bomber, which would incorporate improvements in global positioning systems, update computers. In addition, there would be an incorporation of technological innovations such as the “dial a yield” warhead, which could presumably reduce the fallout from nuclear explosions once they hit their targets. One of the most controversial programs is the plan to deploy a new Long-Range Strike Bomber., which over the course of its development would cost some 38.5 billion dollars. It would be part of the active inventory until the 2080s. The exact specifications of the new bomber are classified. But it is clearly a *new* bomber. There is also the yet controversial program for a Long-Range Standoff cruise missile to replace the air launched cruise missiles now in the inventory. The cost is not outrageous, some 20 billion dollars. However, the Air Force plans to procure at least 1,000 of them over the coming planning period. There is also supposed to be a new class of strategic submarines and SSBMs (submarine ballistic missiles) and warheads.

So, what we have here is not simply modernization, but new systems that will be coming into the inventory. What’s their role? The role for most of them clearly resembles the role that was specified back in the Carter administration of what to do in case deterrence fails. However, it’s more than that. The new objective is to keep alive a role of nuclear weapons, not simply to respond to a nuclear attack, but also to deal with other possible existential threats to the country – by other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including perhaps, those capable of inflicting massive cyber disruptions in the United States. The United States is now preparing through this nuclear modernization program, a capability to fight very many kinds and degrees of strategic warfare. This is justified in conversations with our allies both in Europe and in Japan, as being necessary in order to have a credible deterrent, which would not depend upon the United States obliterating population centers on the part of adversaries,

but would also include capabilities for dealing with threats underneath the level of nuclear attack.

There is now a new literature that has been blossoming in order to justify this kind of very flexible nuclear posture on the part of the United States. For example, a recent publication of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. called Project Atom, advocates something called a Measured Response Strategy for the Nuclear Force Posture, so that the United States could have a discriminate array of options in the football for the President to select in crisis moments of truth. The Project Atom authors justify the need for a robust set of “proportionate nuclear responses” with the following words:

In order to execute its measured response strategy, the nuclear forces for both deterrence and extended deterrence should have low yield, accurate special effect options that can respond proportionately and discriminatively at the lower end of the nuclear continuum. Discriminate employment options would be provided by a suite or by a selection of low yield special effects warheads that would provide low collateral damage, enhanced radiation, earth penetration, electromagnetic pulse and others as technology advances.

Another prominent set of voices for nuclear war-fighting flexibility appeared recently in a publication of New American Security (NAS) – a think tank staffed mainly by former national security officials of the Obama administration. The ideal U.S. nuclear force, contend the NAS authors, is one that is not only highly survivable and able to issue a devastating blow against any adversary and any scenario, but is also capable of conducting limited nuclear operations in a controlled fashion while maintaining the ability to escalate to full scale war if necessary.

In other words, MAD is not dropped. MAD, however, is enlarged upon by other capabilities that could be used before ever having to seriously threaten assured destruction. Maintaining the ability to escalate to full scale war, if necessary, is a force that can achieve reasonably precise affects under a wide spectrum of possible scenarios, enabling a more effective limited nuclear war capability, and providing greater leverage and advantage for the United States.

What we have here is not a clear nuclear strategy. I don't think we're going to get a clear nuclear strategy in the Trump Nuclear Posture Review when it is released. What we are likely to get is an *unclear* (not *nuclear*) grand strategy – its proclaimed virtues being: a wide spectrum of capabilities in which nukes are integrated with other strategic capabilities. This is supposed to enhance the credibility of deterrence – deterrence through ambiguity and

unpredictability of the U.S. response, what we're hearing from President Trump. He loves to say that he is unpredictable, which he indeed has shown himself to be.

The problem with such a grand strategy, however, is that it provides the enemy with little guidance for distinguishing between existential threats to their own deterrence capabilities and rational efforts on the part of their adversaries to defend themselves. How will the enemy know what the United States in a crisis situation is undertaking, if we have this wide array of nuclear capabilities and no coherent doctrine for their use? If anything, it will provoke an enemy into high alert of its own nuclear forces and perhaps preemptive escalation --the ultimate problem of "use them or lose them" with respect to one's own strategic forces.

What is needed in my view is not to rely on the treaty abolishing nuclear weapons, to which the nuclear armed states are simply not going to become parties. Rather (and I have no illusion that the Trump administration is at all likely to do what I'm suggesting here), the United States will eventually have to take the lead in renouncing all uses of weapons and strategies of mass destruction and actions with mass destruction affects. The objective must be to make nuclear weapons and other WMD obsolete for *us* – regardless of what others might do --by having an array of other capabilities which, while not inflicting mass destruction, can respond robustly and sufficiently to deter aggression against us and our allies and to fight effectively if deterrence fails. Neither the U.S. nuclear modernizers nor the nuclear abolitionists are pointing in the right direction. Will the arms control community seize the opportunity to do so?

Discussion

Question 1:

Regarding the North Korean crisis, I understand the United States has developed policy tools other than nuclear or even military strategy, such as economic statecraft like the leverage over the international banking system. So, could you talk about where you see opportunities of where the U.S. is developing its non-nuclear capabilities and where those comparative advantages may be outside nuclear strategy? Can you kindly share your views on what those alternatives might be?

Brown:

Well, I think the premise of your question is important. And that is that there are many other kinds of power besides military power, certainly besides nuclear weapons. So, I endorse the premise of your question. I myself am not a trained international political economist. However, and I listen to the experts on this, who claim there are many aspects of power – economic power, soft power -- that can be used and should be used and are being used short of the use of force.

And when a crisis breaks out, that threatens to become a military crisis, fortunately the United States will first go for that grab bag of capabilities that do not plunge us and world into another major war.

I listen to others articulate to what these various kinds of sanctions are; and in many instances, they work. They appear to have worked with respect to Iran's nuclear capabilities. They appear not to be working with respect to the North Korean policies, not only their nuclear policies but their various aggressive policies. The economic sanctions have been tried vis-a-vis Putin's interventions in Eastern Europe, particularly Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, but appear not to have worked very much there.

They also appear not to have worked very much in persuading Putin not to cooperate with Iran or continue to support Assad in Syria. And up to now they don't appear to be working against the Chinese, in their assertions of maritime sovereignty in the South China and East China Seas.

Any of these conflicts, in which they have not worked, could escalate to a level of military threat, coercive threats, and could cross over the boundary line between non-war coercive moves and actual military moves. I concentrate on what happens if you step over that boundary line, not because I'm an advocate of stepping over that boundary line, but precisely the opposite.

My position is once you step over that line – even if it's not into nuclear war – once

you step over that line in a direct military confrontation between the United States and Russia, or United States and China, the conflict is fraught with escalation to even that higher level. That's my message. So, I would listen to you and to others with respect to how to play the non-military, non-nuclear game.

Question 2:

I understand that the new development of technologies always brings out new strategies. Trump now changes his policy to Iran. My first question is whether this is because of Trump or because of new technologies.

Second, beyond Trump administration, when you have another Democrat administration, what about the preparation on the side of Democrats after Trump? What big idea after Trump is now under consideration by the Democrats?

Brown:

A crucial question for those of us who are not in the administration at this time. And in our informal discussions, we have discussed this to a degree.

Trump is exploiting some of the ambiguities and uncertainties about how the technological developments will be translated into strategy. But this is a systemic problem, which has existed before Trump. In my presentation, I even went back to the Carter administration; and most of the modernization options now under consideration were proposed by Obama administration officials. It's not simply Trump.

I'm most worried about Trump's fingers on the nuclear buttons in the football, and a lot of people are. There has been legislation introduced to provide a set of checks and balances against the use of nuclear options in the football to prevent a first strike unless first authorized by Congress. There were hearings that just about 10 days ago. But the basic impression coming out of that hearing was it's not going to get anywhere, that Congress is really not going to be able to modify the options in the football. Some of us are worried as to *who* football is going to be operated by. But the problematic options are there.

And your question is very important. What, beyond this particular administration, can be done in order to deal with the systemic evolution of geopolitics in which we have an increasing distribution of very lethal capabilities, not only nuclear but other lethal capabilities which can have mass destruction effects, including the mass destruction effects of cyber weapons possessed by small powers. How can we deal with this?

And these diverse military-technological threats are arising at a time when we see a revival of great power rivalry between United States and Russia and United States and China, which a decade ago was not predicted. How can we deal with this? I posed the problem and

offered the overly optimistic notion that somehow this can be controlled by renunciation of the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

But I recognize that that has many problems, and that the opposition party now, and its policy intellectuals like former Secretary of Defense William Perry ought to be thinking about how to deal with the systemic causes of the problems. Not simply how to rebut and criticize Trump, but how to deal with the larger problems. I can't claim that I really have the answer, but I do want to work on it and I want to encourage my colleagues to work on this large systemic issue.

Question 3:

I understand you carefully avoided arguing about the abolition weapons of mass destruction and talked of renunciation of their use. I can see very careful choice of words there. Now the world sees the competition between U.S.-China, U.S.-Russia and the predictability that was somehow built in the Cold War days is gone. So in many ways, we have more volatility in great power relations. I certainly support your proposal for the renunciation of the use for weapons of mass destruction. But then at the same time, it should somehow be incorporated with some diplomacy that works in reducing the danger of unnecessary warfare. I say between U.S.-China, U.S.-Russia. And on that sphere, what would be your proposal? What should be done, aside from Trump?

Brown:

Let me however before trying to respond to what should be done, reflect that the efforts to reduce tension are long range basic efforts. I'm worried that while engaging in those efforts, there can be some flash point, some provocation, that has the danger of escalating. Some of the efforts at tension reduction are focused on those flash points. Confidence building measures, signaling to an adversary that your attack is different from an attempted first strike to disable their capabilities.

But confidence-building measures are hard to implement in an intense crisis. It is very difficult to convince an adversary what your real intentions are, because a lot of the new systems that you're talking about are dual capable. The new cruise missile is capable of carrying nuclear warheads but also capable of carrying non-nuclear, conventional warheads. How do you convince an adversary at a moment of truth and a moment of fright, that the cruise missile is not carrying the wrong kind of warhead? Also, some of these weapons like the new cruise missile, could be targeted on the enemy's offensive prime forces, which they don't want to lose if a war is actually breaking out. So, there is a temptation to fire them off, and so on.

So, some of the tension reduction measures have to focus on the realities of such impending strategic exchanges. The larger problem, obviously, for the world and for the United States, is of trying to build back into the system that the détente relationships that Henry Kissinger tried to implement. Recognizing that at a certain point détente went a bit sour. But such relationships seemed to be developing again in the post-Cold War era, typified by the rather surprising rapport that developed between Gorbachev and Reagan – reflecting the positive side of the new geopolitics: wherein, to the various degrees, countries have become inter-dependent and can bargain with each other across a range of mutual interest and also conflicts. Not the simplified deal-making of a real estate bargainer like Trump, but the very differentiated aspects in virtually every relationship in the contemporary world that the United States has.

And with almost all countries, large countries as well as small countries, in this fluid world, the positive side of it is, that all of them are attempting to diversify their security interests, their economic interests, so as not to become dependent upon any particular power. The hopeful prospect in dealing with China or in dealing with Russia or other aggressor countries, is that the bargaining will take place across a s range of interests, as it does in domestic society.

There are conflicts of interest within our societies, but we resolve our conflicts not necessarily because we're afraid we're going to be arrested and put in jail, but because we are engaged in so many different kinds of dependency relationships. We don't want to be mobilized into a confrontation over issues. They can be worked on.

Instead, Putin tends to dramatize international politics in the older Cold War terms, rather than in the more differentiated array of relationships that Russia, like others, has with many countries. I also have considerable discontent about what the Trump administration is doing to the State Department. Diplomacy, the non-coercive aspects of foreign policy does o involve carrots and sticks, though the sticks are non-coercive in the larger sense. This combination is the province of the State Department. It should be. The Defense Department has developed some capabilities for this, but that's not where the expertise lies -- The expertise about different cultures, the expertise about the different needs and requirements for development many countries have.

It's very disturbing that the soft power element is being pushed aside, and the notion that raw power is the determinant of who gets what, when, and how in international politics is being revived. The revival of that kind of *Realpolitik* is very unfortunate. How this is going to materialize and work itself out in the Trump administration, we are all wondering at this point.

Question 4:

I've heard that there are some recent argument that the ICBMs are no longer needed in the triad because they're too vulnerable. Is there any attempt for unilateral reduction of ICBM in the U.S. side, and if so, do you think that will have any impact on Russia and China, and others?

Brown:

The perpetuation of a so-called Triad (the strategic nuclear capabilities carried by land-based ICBMs, the nuclear missile capabilities being carried by submarines, and the nuclear capabilities being carried by aircraft, by bombers) is periodically challenged. One of those who has challenged it openly has been former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who says we don't anymore really need the most vulnerable part of the triad, which is the land-based ICBMs. And there is a built-in inertia of course on the part of those who have bought, and who operate the programs. There's a built-in inertia, an unwillingness to say we don't need this anymore.

But the logic of the Triad is due for considerable debate. Meanwhile the modernization programs are going ahead. And the cost of this, the modernization programs, is quite high. The estimates are that over a period of 30 years the outlays for will be over 1.3 trillion dollars.

Back to the question of the Triad: The willingness to do away with it revives the old arguments about the importance of having the redundancy; that if for some reason if the satellite guidance that your submarines depend upon is interfered with and they're taken out of the equation, that you still have a functioning strategic missile arsenal.

My view of it is, that if it got that bad and we have to use our ICBMs, the world itself would be vulnerable to tremendous devastation, tremendous holocaust that it may be too late for anything. But our strategists, some of them at least, are still advocates of the ICBMs.

Moreover, the United States can do things that are in its own interest unilaterally without necessarily having to wait for an agreement by others. With respect to its reliance on nuclear weapons, the United States could essentially make its nuclear arsenal obsolete by relying on other strategies and other systems that have a more controllable effect. We could, and should, do that because it's in our own interest. And we ought not to necessarily have to wait to see if the Russians or the Chinese agree with us.

Question 5:

I think, without face-to-face relations among military men, it will be difficult to ensure peace. My personal idea is to promote personal exchange among military officers, for instance, by organizing events to have the world's military organizations present flowers and vases to

each other. What do you think of this idea?

Brown:

I think it an interesting phenomenon the more dangerous factions in various countries are not the military these days. They more dangerous ones are the political leaders who want these toys as it were to be used by the military. One of the most constructive leaders in the recent past in the United States has been General, and then Secretary of State, Colin Powell who frequently -- despite his being enlisted to the support the invasion of Iraq in 2003 -- argued against the resort to military force. invasion has argued for a lot of military contexts. There also have been, going back to the Reagan administration and even before the Reagan and Carter administrations, a lot of military to military contacts between the Americans and the Chinese.

Now they don't necessarily have to present each other flowers, but they do respect one another, and in many respects, they have indicated they respect the fact of the dilemmas on which the military have to operate. They professionally respect one another. There have been a lot of agreements as to how to reassure one another that something is not hostile: advance notice of troop deployments or re-deployments, invitations to be present and actually observe military exercises that are going on. So that both sides can see that those are not hostile acts in preparation. And I think that many distinguished military officers would say, yes, we agree with your flower exchange approach.

Question 6:

Sometimes soldiers are much more professional and dependable than civilians in discussing wars and that's the hard duality we face nowadays. The specialists will come up with every single justification for mixing nuclear capability to a larger strategic objective, not only legitimize but also expand it. And new terrains for military force which you have observed have caught my attention. This is something we have observed before and we're seeing right now.

To reverse the trend, I do agree with you, that we need to work on restraining the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Otherwise there's always the possibility of escalation. If I may say so, Tokyo has learned to stop worrying and left it to the Trump administration for that matter. And Beijing has been competing with Tokyo in showing the greater red carpet treatment to Mr. Trump. In this situation, the allies would have a vested interest having a more belligerent United States; it could be to their advantage. Tokyo was very happy about Trump being tough on North Korea, for example. That was one of the reasons the no-first-use idea was rejected. I believe the American government did not reject it because they

thought it was against their interest. The argument was that the allies won't accept it. So how do you think about this alliance and relationship with nuclear grand strategy as it stands, especially by those who are dependent on extend deterrence?

Brown: Well, the extend deterrence problem is key, is central. How to reassure partners and allies that if they have been a victim of an attack by a nuclear-armed power -- in this part of the world it could be a small country like Vietnam being a victim by an attack by the Chinese over the maritime sovereignty issues. The reassurance doesn't have to rely upon the U.S.'s first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict that is not nuclear. The no-first-use of nuclear weapons can be no-first-use except in conditions where an ally has been a victim of a nuclear attack.

Now if you would recall back in the Nixon years, it was something called the Nixon doctrine which was devoted basically to the situation in Asia. The Nixon doctrine said that the United States will not use nuclear weapons unless the victim of an attack is attacked by a nuclear power. So, you can have a no-first-use under those circumstances. You can still preserve under extended deterrence the option of responding in a devastating way to an attack against one of your allies or your friends. And I think that's the kind of clarification that is needed.

It ought not to be automatic, but I think that that's what is meant. Article Five of the NATO Treaty is that an attack upon one will be regarded as an attack upon the whole alliance. But the United States can also provide that assurance in bilateral relationships. It can preserve the notion that a nuclear attack against Japan would activate a nuclear response against North Korea, for example. Or for if it ever happened, then into China. But it ought not to be automatically nuclear.

My position is, the world needs to move toward recognition that strategies and Weapons of Mass Destruction are no longer in the human interest. Not in anybody's human interest. And that any country that engaged in a massive attack would be engaging in a criminal action, whether that mass attack was with nuclear weapons, with biological weapons, or even cyber weapons or some new invention, that such mass destruction is not in the human interest. More than that, it is a crime against humanity.

I'm arguing that the United States is in a position in which we could have a more credible posture of extended deterrence if the instruments of our extended deterrence were not an instrument that required us to inflict mass casualties. If our instruments of deterrence were ones in which the United States had the capability of reducing substantially the power, particularly the military power, of any attacker, and we could do that without obliterating their population, it would be more credible. So, at the present juncture, although still highly

dependent upon strategies of extended deterrence which have a nuclear component, it is time for the United States to begin to make those nuclear responses that are part of the philosophy extended deterrence *obsolete*, and to develop more credible strategies and capabilities for extended deterrence –strategies that would not require the U.S. president to incinerate, say, the whole population of Pyongyang.

Question7:

I have a question regarding the adversaries of the United States because the United States has the power to develop such a wide array of nuclear capabilities that Russia is probably less able to do so especially because President Putin said that he was more working towards development of Satan-2 missiles which are more like mass destruction missiles. And China also is now studying working towards the same strategy. So, do you feel that the adversaries of United States are having this kind of debate and are shifting towards more nuclear deterrents that do not imply mass destruction. And also, how do you make sure the United States is not developing such weapons of its own through some sort of paranoia?

Brown:

I think I understand your question here. And that it relates back to the unilateral issue that we were talking about. I don't operate under the assumption that if the United States discarded its own nuclear strategies and weapons that others would imitate us, at least not at this particular time.

What I'm asking us to consider is whether or not we could live with that. With moving into the direction of unilateral nuclear disarmament, or at least unilateral renunciation of nuclear use. I've broadened it to banning all policies of mass destruction, asking whether we could live in a situation in which others still try to intimidate us with threats of mass destruction.

We would have to have a very articulate leadership to be able to sell that both to the American people as well as to allies. Let's say United States but not Russia, renounced the use of weapons of mass destruction.

My position is that this allows us to rely on a more credible second strike, more credible retaliation. And we should do that because it is more credible, because it is in our interest. And we should begin to try to convince others that that is the case. Even if others are not ready to follow us.